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The ecclesiological dimensions of apostasy in the contemporary world

Modern ecclesiological heresies corrupt the very concept of the Church. Ecumenism, as a theological concept, organized social movement and religious practice, is such a heresy. Many spirit-bearing Orthodox hierarchs and theologians of the preceding twentieth century defined it as heresy in its essence. One of the major steps in the attempt to implement the ecumenical idea of uniting “divided Christians” and reconstructing the “undivided Church” was the church calendar reform in a number of local Orthodox churches during the twentieth century. It should be noted, however, that as a multi-stage, infiltrative heresy, ecumenism defies exhaustive and accurate definition, since, unlike the ancient heresies, it does not seek to find clear and consistent doctrinal expression by claiming to be accepted conciliarly or pose as a truth of the Faith formulated by the consciousness of the Church. On the one hand, for the time being, few are those hierarchs, clerics and theologians who simultaneously consider themselves Orthodox and profess ecumenism in its most extreme forms of inter-religious syncretism, or in its “pure” form of ecclesiological heresy, claiming that, owing to the divisions among Christians, the one visible Church of Christ no longer exists and, therefore, has to be recreated in the womb of the ecumenical movement. On the other hand, ecumenism continues to coalesce with official Orthodoxy. The official Orthodox episcopate is responsible for this phenomenon, demonstrating a crafty political and diplomatic attitude towards the process, categorically refusing to condemn ecumenism as a multi-stage, multi-faceted ecclesiological heresy, albeit it is nonetheless indisputably so in its true nature. In this context, the exit of the Bulgarian Patriarchate from the World Council of Churches in 1998, unfortunately, proved to be only a tactic with a certain ecclesio-political purpose, and not a step determined by a reëvaluation of its attitude towards ecumenism rendered in principle.

Another phenomenon with an ecclesiological dimension is socalled Sergianism, which in the unprecedented circumstances of the persecution of the Church in the former Soviet Union surrendered an outwardly proper church institution to the Bolsheviks so that, in their hands, it could become a tool in a fierce battle against the Church Herself, as representing the fullness of the Truth of Christ. In fact, Sergianism is not simply a characteristically Russian phenomenon. It also embraced the local Orthodox churches in the countries of Eastern Europe, where, after World War II, communist régimes were established. Both in the Soviet Union and in these countries, the essence of Sergianism manifested itself in the (self-) delusion that deception could be used as a means to help truth “survive,” and that collaboration with the enemies of the Church was the way to “protect” Her. In practice, the logical consequence was just the opposite – the episcopate adopting this position became a tool in the hands of the communist atheists, who schemed to achieve full control over the Church, to the end of Her moral and spiritual enfeeblement and with a view to Her ultimate annihilation, which they intended. More specifically, the ecclesiological aspect of Sergianism comes down to distorting the concept of “canonicity.” In the Sergianist context, canonicity is unnaturally torn away from the Spirit and the Truth of canonical tradition and turns into formal adherence to the norm, which can be used to vindicate any act of lawlessness committed by the governing episcopate. Ultimately, canonicity degenerates into a managerial technique for the subordination of the people of the Church to that episcopate, regardless of the direction in which it leads them. In other words, as Archpriest Michael Polsky, an eyewitness to the cruel persecutions and the perfidious fight against the Russian Church in the 1920s, writes, “Metropolitan Sergius and his bishops differ from the Renovationists in that they keep to the canons at all costs and safeguard them more than anything else. They (the Sergianists) do not disregard the canons, as do the Renovationists. But there arises a gross discrepancy. When the Renovationists lied, slandered, or deceived, that was bad because they were not canonical. However, when Metropolitan Sergius slandered and lied, this was considered good, since he was canonical. It turns out that to him who is canonical, everything is allowed. This mocks the canons and morality alike by distorting their meaning.” After the collapse of the totalitarian régimes towards the end of the twentieth century, under the new conditions
of political freedom, Sergianism was preserved as a legacy of the past and, at the same time, was transformed. Having long incorporated unscrupulousness, deception and pathological servility to those in positions of authority into its inner nature, it not only continues to betray the Church – now no longer for fear of reprisals but for the sake of mercenary motives – but has also started to sell Her freedom, under the guise of “canonicity,” in exchange for gaining the friendship of the powers that be, with the ensuing material benefits and prestigious social status. In this modified form, today Sergianism (as neo-Sergianism or post-Sergianism) affects a large part of the episcopate of the official local Churches around the world.

Once phenomena such as ecumenism and Sergianism become systematic and universal, even when they do not seek a clear doctrinal expression but penetrate and spread into the body of the Church in a “creeping” manner – that is, once they have been actively adopted or passively allowed by all bishops of one or more local Churches – then the essence of the struggle against these phenomena comes down to the termination of ecclesiastical communion with those bishops who instil heresy in the Church in a conciliar manner, either by preaching it or by contributing to its dissemination though their passivity and silence (see Canon 15 of the First-Second Synod of Constantinople).

THE CONCEPTS OF “OFFICIAL ORTHODOXY” AND “OFFICIAL LOCAL CHURCHES”

These concepts have an idiosyncratic ecclesiological substance and reveal the specifics of the processes of apostasy in the contemporary Orthodox world. Orthodoxy is sui generis and does not need further clarification by any additional denotations. The need to add one or another modifier to the term “Orthodoxy” has arisen because of the replacement of its original and authentic substance under pressure from ecumenist and Sergianist mentalities, from liberalism, relativism and other apostatic phenomena. The meaning of the concept of “official Orthodoxy” is closely connected with the meaning of the concept of “official Church” and “official local Churches,” respectively. “Official Orthodoxy” is the peculiar ideology of the “official local Churches.” It represents an increasingly diluted, pluralistic Orthodoxy, which is gradually tearing itself away from its spiritual identity and increasingly becoming a surrogate for authentic Orthodoxy, without reforming it abruptly or defiantly. The main distinctive feature of official Orthodoxy is its Sergianist conjuncture; i.e., its collaborative adjustment to the realities of our time, with a view towards accommodating various political and ecclesiastical courses: outwardly as an expression of the catholic consciousness of the Church, but in essence, as a situational strategy, with terminology or behaviour typical of the corporate mentality. For example, official Orthodoxy may resound with loud ecumenical tones; and contrariwise, at times, the prevalent tone may be that of traditionalist rhetoric. Moreover, as already mentioned,”official Orthodoxy” never takes a clear, principled, conciliar stand on the nature of ecumenism as the ecclesiological heresy with which it is entwined, inasmuch as the majority of the supporters and propagators of this heresy still avoid designating it wholly openly and clearly as an article of their religious creed. In official Orthodoxy, the connection between announcements and intentions, between speaking and believing, between words and conscience fades out, becomes debased in a Jesuitical manner, and in this sense is severed. Thus, for example, in a private conversation a bishop might dissociate himself from some official deed of his – from a public statement or from a document he has signed containing views contrary to Orthodoxy, i.e., heretical views – but that same bishop chooses not to do this publicly since it is at variance with official church policy.

What does the term “official Church” mean? It is what the Russian catacomb believers called the Church recognized by the Soviet régime (and completely dependent on it), headed by Metropolitan (and later Patriarch) Sergius Stragorodsky (+ 1943). The terms “Official Church” or “official local Churches” refer to the known, historically formed local Churches whose hierarchical leadership officially accepts, advances or authorizes ecumenism as a theological concept and religious practice, uses conciliar deception on sundry occasions, hides under the cloak of “canonicity” as understood in the spirit of Sergianism, and adopts other forms of apostasy from Orthodoxy. In brief, the term “official Churches” extends to the known, historically formed local Churches which are in a state of apostasy – a process that has been coördinated or permitted to develop conciliarly by the episcopate.

The text has been reproduced from A Position Paper published under the supervision of Bishop Foti of Triaditza

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